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Electoral Data in Racial-Bloc Analysis: A
Solution for Staleness and Special
Circumstances Problems
Richard R. Hespt
Since Congress enacted the 1982 amendments to Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA"),' courts have experienced
difficulty interpreting its broad language. The existence of only
one major Supreme Court decision interpreting that provision,
Thornburg v Gingles,2 has hindered these efforts. Although the
Gingles Court sought to aid judicial interpretation of Section 2, it
complicated matters with its plurality opinion and multiple
concurrences. The Court stated that one of the most important
factors in a Section 2 challenge is "'the extent to which voting in
the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polar-
ized.'"3 However, it gave only ambiguous instructions on how to
rank the probative value of elections in the polarization analysis.
Part I of this Comment discusses the evolution of the VRA,
as amended, and the Gingles Court's endorsement of the results
approach. Under that analysis, VRA plaintiffs can demonstrate
either that government officials operated the electoral system
with discriminatory intent or that an electoral structure or prac-
tice results in racial discrimination.4 While the results-based test
is intuitively easier to grasp, it is predicated on the difficult task
of proving that "a bloc voting majority.., usually... defeat[s]
candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically
insular minority group."5
Lower courts would experience little trouble determining
whether exclusionary voting practices exist if Section 2 litigation
t B.A. 1993, Stanford University; J.D. Candidate 1996, University of Chicago.
42 USC § 1973 (1988).
2 478 US 30 (1986).
Gingles, 478 US at 48-49 n 15, quoting S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2nd Sess 28-9
(1982).
See Nipper v Smith, 39 F3d 1494, 1524 (11th Cir 1994)("Nipper IF), cert denied
1995 WL 05718 (applying results-based test with electorate racial-bias requirement); Id at
1549 (Hatchett dissenting)(applying results-based test with no electorate-bias require-
ment).
' Gingles, 478 US at 49 (citations omitted).
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were always supported by a large number of contemporary,
relevant election results. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case.
Under Gingles's "totality of the circumstances" analysis,6 Section
2 plaintiffs often must prove both that their electoral data is rele-
vant, probative, and accurate, and that the challenged electoral
practice or structure intentionally or effectively barred minority
participation. Courts have thus needed to determine: (1) the
value of stale election results; and (2) whether "special circum-
stances" can only be used to demonstrate that racial-bloc voting
exists in the face of minority success.
Part II of this Comment proposes that legislative intent,
judicial opinion, and demographic realities support discounting
election data that is more than ten years old. Although some
courts have declared that all election results, no matter how old,
count equally,' others have criticized this approach, arguing that
"stale" elections-those past some specified time period-are of
little analytical value.8 This Comment recognizes that demo-
graphic reality may require substantial weighing in favor of
recent elections. Discounting elections for staleness, however, can
reinforce the barriers that have blocked minority access to the
electoral process. In response, this Comment proposes that courts
faced with few electoral results track general voting trends
through exogenous elections, or elections for offices not at stake
in the VRA litigation.' Inclusion of these elections would help
alleviate fears of a decreased number of probative elections.
Part III of this Comment rejects a back-door reintroduction
of the abandoned intent test through special circumstances
analysis. In Gingles, the Court explained:
[T]he success of a minority candidate in a particular
election does not necessarily prove that the district did
not experience polarized voting in that election; special
Id at 44 n 8, citing White v Regester, 412 US 755 (1973)(holding disestablishment of
multimember districts valid), and Zimmer v McKeithen, 485 F2d 1297 (5th Cir
1973)(finding proof of dilution established via aggregate of multiple factors).
' See Nipper v Smith, 1 F3d 1171 (11th Cir 1993)("Nipper I")(finding that twenty-
year-old election results should be considered); McMillan v Escambia County, 748 F2d
1037 (5th Cir 1984)(holding, in part, that prior election results demonstrated a history of
discrimination).
8 See League of Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v Clements, 999 F2d 831
(5th Cir 1993)("LULAC I")(criticizing the probative value of dated statistics); Nipper v
Chiles, 795 F Supp 1525 (M D Fla 1992)(finding that staleness of election results had a
negative effect on their probative value).
9 Citizens for a Better Gretna v City of Gretna, Louisiana, 834 F2d 496, 502-03 (5th
Cir 1987)(discussing the need for a flexible standard in vote-dilution claims).
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circumstances, such as the absence of an opponent [or]
incumbency... may explain minority electoral success
in a polarized contest."1
Thus, special circumstances act like a "wildcard" to show that
racial-bloc voting exists despite occasional minority victories."
The standard special circumstances example is an election where
a minority sponsored candidate runs unopposed. In that situa-
tion, the majority bloc cannot prevent the minority electorate
from electing its preferred candidate. However, the Eleventh
Circuit has addressed the opposite issue: whether majority-candi-
date incumbency should be used to discount the existence of
racial polarization when a minority candidate loses. 2 Part III
thus concludes that using special circumstances in this manner
undermines the Gingles results test and should be rejected.
I. SECTION 2, AS AMENDED, REQUIRES OBJECTIVE
DEMONSTRATION THAT ELECTORAL PRACTICES OR STRUCTURES
RESULT IN UNEQUAL MINORITY ACCESS
In 1965, Congress enacted the VRA 3 to enforce the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States' Consti-
tution as well as Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. 4 The
VRA's primary goal was to eliminate any direct discriminatory
structure or practice that denied African-American electoral
equality. 5 The VRA concentrated on direct barriers rather than
more subtle obstructions to minority equality." For instance,
Section 2 prohibits any electoral practice that discriminates on
10 Gingles, 478 US at 57.
" Id.
12 See Chiles, 795 F Supp at 1525 (holding white incumbency could be used to dis-
count the presence of racial polarization).
13 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, codified at 42 USC
§ 1973 (1988), states: "No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to
deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) . ... "
" House Judiciary Committee Report on the Voting Rights Act of 1965, HR Rep No
89-439, 89th Cong, 1st Sess (1965), reprinted in 1965 USCCAN 2437.
"' Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 Mich L Rev 1833, 1838 (1992)(discussing the objectives
of the VRA). See, generally, Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting
Rights, 42 Vand L Rev 1249, 1250 (1989)(discussing the VRA).
10 See generally HR Rep No 89-439 (cited in note 14). "To accomplish this objective
the bill (1) suspends the use of literacy and other tests and devices in areas where there is
reason to believe that such tests and devices have been used and are being used to deny
the right to vote on account of race or color ... ." Id at 1.
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the basis of race" and Section 4 prohibits the use of literacy
tests or similar means to deny the right to vote.Is The VRA also
included a bailout provision allowing the former Confederate
States that were subject to extensive supervision under the VRA
to be excluded from its regulations if those states could demon-
strate nondiscriminatory electoral practices during the prior five-
year period.'9 The House of Representatives' Judiciary Commit-
tee wrote that the "cooling off period" was "both reasonable and
necessary to permit dissipation of the long-established political
atmosphere and tradition of discrimination in voting because of
color in those States and subdivisions .... ."'2 Congress's ac-
knowledgement in the bailout provision that these states could
uncouple themselves from their discriminatory past and facilitate
minority access to the electoral process strongly suggests that
Congress recognized that old election data could become unreIfre-
sentative of an electorate's changing character.
For fifteen years, the Court broadly interpreted the VRA and
held that "plaintiffs could prevail by showing that, under the
totality of the circumstances, a challenged election law or proce-
dure had the effect of denying a protected minority an equal
chance to participate in the electoral process."21 This judicially
created test was results oriented. A potential VRA plaintiff had
to "produce evidence to support findings that the political pro-
cesses leading to nomination and election were not equally open
to participation by the group in question-that its members had
less opportunity than did other residents in the district, to partici-
pate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice."22
1 42 USC § 1973.
18 42 USC § 1973b.
' HR Rep No 89-439 at 14 (cited in note 14).
20 Id.
2 Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 44 n 8 (1986), citing White v Regester, 412 US 755
(1973), and Zimmer v McKeithen, 485 F2d 1297 (5th Cir 1973). See Allen v State Board of
Elections, 393 US 544, 569 (1969)("The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting
power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot."); Beer v United States,
425 US 130 (1976)(holding VRA's basic purpose is to rid the country of racial discrimi-
nation in voting).
22 White, 412 US at 766. See also Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 US 124, 148-50
(1971)(discussing the requirements for vote-dilution challenges).
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A. City of Mobile v Bolden Abandoned the Results Test
Despite the established framework described above, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court adopted a new test in City of Mobile v
Bolden.23 In Bolden, the Court held that in order to be success-
ful plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the electoral practice or
structure was "conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to
further racial... discrimination."24 Plaintiffs faced an extraordi-
nary burden under this test, because the test required extensive
research into the legislative, political, and social history of the
challenged electoral process.2" Not surprisingly, when the Court
applied this new intent-based test to Bolden's facts, it found that
the plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating pur-
poseful discrimination."
B. The VRA Amendments of 1982: Congress Rejected Bolden
In response to Bolden,27 Congress enacted the 1982 amend-
ments to Section 2 of the VRA28 "to make clear that a violation
could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone and to
establish as the relevant legal standard the 'results test. . .
3 446 US 55 (1980).
24 Id at 66, quoting Whitcomb, 403 US at 149.
2 See Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1982, S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 16, 19 n 59 (1982), reprinted in 1982 USCCAN
177, 193, 196 n 59.
2' Bolden, 446 US at 71-74.
' Gingles, 478 US at 35. "The amendment was largely a response to this Court's
plurality opinion in Mobile v Bolden ... which had declared that, in order to establish a
violation of either § 2 or of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, minority voters
must prove that a contested electoral mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained
by state officials for a discriminatory purpose." Id (citation omitted).
' Section 2 of the VRA, 42 USC § 1973, provides in part:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or pro-
cedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of anycitizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color ....
(b) A violation of subsection (a)... is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation
by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) ... in that its mem-
bers have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to
which members of a protected class have been elected to office.., is one circum-
stance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section estab-
lishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population.
2 Gingles, 478 US at 35.
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Congress replaced the Bolden intent test with one that only re-
quired plaintiffs to demonstrate that the contested electoral
structure or practice resulted in discrimination against minority
participation." "If the [Section 2) plaintiff proceeds under the
'results test,' then the court would assess the impact of the chal-
lenged structure or practice on the basis of objective factors,
rather than making a determination about the motivations which
lay behind its adoption or maintenance."3
While Congress implicitly acknowledged the effect of time on
electoral practices in the VRA's 1965 enactment,32 in the 1982
amendments it explicitly "prohibit[ed] practices which, while
episodic and not involving permanent structural barriers, re-
sult[ed] in the denial of equal access to any phase of the electoral
process for minority group members."33 Regarding the 1982
amendments, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated, "the ques-
tion whether ... political processes are 'equally open' depends
upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and present
reality."'34 The Bolden intent test was inherently unsuited for
this endeavor because it diverted courts from "the crucial ques-
tion of whether minorities have equal access to the electoral pro-
cess to a historical question of individual motives."35
Further, Congress implicitly acknowledged that old electoral
practices could become stale when it revamped the bail-out pro-
visions by weighing current performance as more probative than
a region's historical actions.3" "[T]he Committee bail-out [was] a
'0 The Senate bill that proposed the amendment provided:
S. 1992 amends Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to prohibit any voting
practice, or procedure [that] results in discrimination. This amendment is de-
signed to make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is not required to estab-
lish a violation of Section 2. It thereby restores the legal standards, based on the
controlling Supreme Court precedents, which applied in voting discrimination
claims prior to the litigation involved in Mobile v Bolden. The amendment also
adds a new subsection to Section 2 which delineates the legal standards under
the results test by codifying the leading pre-Bolden vote dilution case, White v
Regester.
S Rep No 97-417 at 2 (cited in note 25).
31 Id at 27.
32 See notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
2' See S Rep No 97-417 at 30 (cited in note 25).
34 Id.
'5 Id at 16. "The Committee has concluded that this intent test places an unaccept-
ably difficult burden on plaintiffs." Id.
" 42 USC § 1973b. See also S Rep No 97-417 at 46 (cited in note 25). "The Commit-
tee bailout retains the twofold criteria of the House Bill. First, the jurisdiction must show
a ten-year record of full compliance with the Voting Rights Act and the constitutional
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recognition that the passage of time, by itself, means very little.
In short, the new bailout focuses on criteria more relevant to
whether continuing coverage is warranted than does an inquiry
that looks only at the jurisdiction's conduct 17 years ago."37
C. Thornburg v Gingles Gives Little Assistance with Temporal
Guidelines
The Supreme Court applied Congress's results test for the
first time in Thornburg v Gingles. s The North Carolina General
Assembly enacted a legislative redistricting plan for the State
Senate and House of Representatives. 9 The plaintiffs, registered
African-American voters, challenged the redistricting scheme on
the ground that it impaired African-American citizens' ability to
elect representatives of their choice in violation of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments and Section 2 of the VRA.4 ° In its
decision, the Court discussed the proper application of the 1982
amendments to the VRA.4' Justice Brennan agreed with the ma-
jority report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which found that
the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized was a major probative factor in a
Section 2 challenge.2 Justice Brennan explained that although
protection of the right to vote. Second, it must demonstrate that it has taken positive
steps to achieve full minority access to the political process." Id.
37 Id.
478 US at 30.
Id at 34-35.
SId at 35.
Id at 42.
42 See Gingles, 478 US at 37. The Senate Report lists the following "typical factors"
relevant to establishing a Section 2 violation:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to reg-
ister, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision
is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large
election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or
other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for dis-
crimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority
group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, em-
ployment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial
appeals;
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the Senate Report's enumerated factors were relevant in examin-
ing electoral access,' the primary factor was that "a bloc voting
majority must usually be able to defeat candidates supported by
a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group.""
The preconditions necessary to demonstrate that a multimember
district impairs minority voters' ability to elect representatives of
their choice are: the minority group is sufficiently large and geo-
graphically compact to constitute a majority in a single member
district;' the minority group is politically cohesive; 4 and the
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority's pre-
ferred candidate in the absence of special circumstances."7 Jus-
tice Brennan reiterated that "courts and commentators agree
that racial bloc voting is a key element of a vote dilution
claim."' Congress's adoption of the results test necessitated the
plurality opinion's reliance on proof of racially polarized voting
patterns.
Despite this clear mandate to examine racial polarization,
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion gives only brief instruction on
which elections are most strongly weighted in this analysis. The
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to pub-
lic office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of
plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are: whether there is a significant
lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs
of the members of the minority group; whether the policy underlying the state
or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
S Rep No 97-417 at 28-30 (cited in note 25).
Gingles, 478 US at 48 n 15.
" Id at 49 (emphasis added)(citation omitted).
'5 Id at 50.
Id at 51.
17 Gingles, 478 US at 51.
Id at 55, citing McMillan v Escambia County, Florida, 748 F2d 1037, 1043 (5th Cir
1984); United States v Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F2d 1546, 1566 (11th Cir
1984)(holding that the Constitution does not prohibit a results standard); Nevett v Sides,
571 F2d 209, 223 (5th Cir 1978)(discussing bloc voting); Johnson v Halifax County, 594 F
Supp 161, 170 (E D NC 1984)(holding VRA guaranteed African-American citizens the
equal opportunity to participate in the political process); James U. Blacksher and Larry T.
Menefree, From Reynolds v Sims to City of Mobile v Bolden, 34 Hastings L J 1
(1982)(discussing the evolution of the VRA); Richard L. Engstrom and John K Wildgen, Prun-
ing Thorns from the Thicket: An Empirical Test of the Existence of Racial Gerrymandering,
2 Legis Stud Q 465, 469 (1977)(discussing methods for estimating degrees of vote dilu-
tion); Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in
Minority Vote Dilution 86-100 (Davidson, 1984); Note, Geometry and Geography: Racial
Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act, 94 Yale L J 189, 199 (1984)(discussing the
impact of the VRA).
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Court stated that "a pattern of racial bloc voting that extends
over a period of time is more probative of a claim that a district
experiences legally significant polarization than are the results of
a single election."49 The Court further explained that "[tihe
number of elections that must be studied in order to determine
whether voting is polarized will vary according to pertinent cir-
cumstances.""0 For example, "[w]here a minority group has be-
gun to sponsor candidates just recently, the fact that statistics
from only one or a few elections are available for examination
does not foreclose a vote dilution claim."5' Thus, Gingles indi-
cates that one election may or may not be sufficient to demon-
strate racial-bloc voting.
Unfortunately, on its facts Gingles sheds little light on the
application of the Court's temporal guidelines in more challeng-
ing situations. In Gingles, the Court relied on fifty-three General
Assembly primary and general races involving African-American
candidates over the course of three election years,52 all within
three years of the original complaint's filing.5" The Court's fail-
ure to elaborate on the probative value of old and recent elections
has left the lower courts without any guidance. The Court also
offered no extended discussion of special circumstances. The
Court stated that special circumstances could include the absence
of an opponent or incumbency, but did not fully explore the
weight of their impact in the polarization analysis.'
" Gingles, 478 US at 57. "[A] pattern of racial bloc voting that extends over a period
of time is more probative of a claim that a district experiences legally significant polar-
ization than are the results of a single election .... Also for this reason, in a district
where elections are shown usually to be polarized, the fact that racially polarized voting is
not present in one or a few individual elections does not necessarily negate the conclusion
that the district experiences legally significant bloc voting. Furthermore, the success of a
minority candidate in a particular election does not necessarily prove that the district did
not experience polarized voting in that election; special circumstances, such as the ab-
sence of an opponent, incumbency, or the utilization of bullet voting, may explain minority
electoral success in a polarized contest." Id (citations omitted).
'0 Id at 57 n 25.
51 Id.
52 Gingles, 478 US at 60 n 29.
'3 Id.
' Id at 57. "[T]he success of a minority candidate in a particular election does not
necessarily prove that the district did not experience polarized voting in that election; spe-
cial circumstances, such as the absence of an opponent, incumbency, or the utilization of
bullet voting, may explain minority electoral success in a polarized contest." Id. 'This list
of special circumstances is illustrative, not exclusive." Gingles, 478 US at 57 n 26.
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II. COURTS SHOULD DISCOUNT STALE ELECTION DATA TO
REFLECT LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND DEMOGRAPHIC REALITY
The lower courts have interpreted Gingles differently. Some
courts have read Gingles to require a scrutiny of all elections.
Others have questioned the validity of analyzing "stale" election
data that no longer reflects the electorate's changed political and
demographic character.
A. Some Courts Have Rejected Election Weighing to Avoid
Penalizing Minority Voters
Some courts have considered all election data in order to
avoid penalizing minority groups that have not been represented
in any recent election due to low probability of success. In Nipper
v Smith ("Nipper I'), 55 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the "failure to consider the possibility that '[African-
American] candidates "don't run because they can't win"' in
weighing such evidence 'would allow voting-rights cases to be
defeated at the outset by the very barriers to political participa-
tion that Congress has sought to remove.'"5" The court further
stated that a contrary approach would "penaliz[e] [minority
groups] ... because black candidates [had] not run in... the
recent past." " Citing Fifth and Eleventh Circuit precedent,"8
the Nipper I court argued that scarce electoral data had not pre-
vented granting of relief in other Section 2 litigation.59 However,
the court did not state when, if ever, an election would simply be
too old to aid an analysis nor did it discuss the issue of weighing.
The Fifth Circuit has also advocated using all elections, no
matter how old. In McMillan v Escambia County, ° no minority-
sponsored candidates had run in elections between 1970 and the
1 F3d 1171 (11th Cir 1993).
Id at 1179, quoting Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v City of Westwego, 872 F2d
1201, 1208 n 9 (5th Cir 1989)(finding that the United States Supreme Court refused to
preclude vote-dilution claims where few African-American candidates had sought office
under the challenged electoral system).
'7 See Nipper 1, 1 F3d at 1179.
Id at 1179, citing Solomon v Liberty County, 899 F2d 1012 (11th Cir 1990)(finding
that six elections were sufficient to support a voting-rights challenge). See also Citizens
for a Better Gretna v City of Gretna, Louisiana, 834 F2d 496, 500-03 (5th Cir 1987);
Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 82 (1986).
' Nipper 1, 1 F3d at 1179, citing McMillan v Escambia County, 748 F2d 1037, 1045
(5th Cir 1984); Gingles, 478 US at 57 n 25; Westwego, 872 F2d at 1208-09, 1209 n 9.
8' 748 F2d at 1037.
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initiation of the litigation in 1977.1 The court explained that
the lack of elections involving minority candidates did not advan-
tage the defendant because the absence of such candidates was a
result of the county's racially discriminatory system." Likewise,
in Citizens for a Better Gretna v City of Gretna, Louisiana63 the
court held that a finding of racial polarization could be substanti-
ated by elections in 1977 and 1979, and exogenous data from
1979 and 1984. The court premised its holding on Gingles's
view of sparse data: "'[W]here a minority group has begun to
sponsor candidates just recently the fact that statistics from only
one or a few elections are available for examination does not
foreclose a vote dilution claim."'65 Thus, the Fifth Circuit main-
tained that failing to consider the possibility that African-Ameri-
can candidates "'don't run because they can't win"' in weighing
electoral evidence would allow voting rights cases to fail because
of the very barriers to political participation that the VRA and its
amendments were designed to remove.66
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the weighing of elections in
League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v
Clements ("LULAC P). 67 The court applied the Gingles three-
pronged test on a county-by-county basis in Texas. In Jefferson
County, the court relied on eight judicial elections occurring be-
tween 1972 and 1988.6" The defendants argued that the court
should give more weight to the elections which occurred during
the 1980s. However, the court disagreed, explaining that "[w]hen
a district court is faced with a sparsity of data, it must remain
flexible."69
" Id at 1045.
Id. "Nor does the fact that no black ran for the Commission between 1970 and the
time this litigation commenced, help defendants. Rather, the lack of black candidates is a
likely result of a racially discriminatory system." Id (citations omitted).
834 F2d at 496.
Id at 502.
Citizens for a Better Gretna, 834 F2d at 502, quoting Gingles, 478 US at 57 n 25.
See Westwego, 872 F2d at 1208-09 n 9.
986 F2d 728 (5th Cir 1993).
Id at 792.
' Id, citing Citizens for a Better Gretna, 834 F2d at 502, and Gingles, 478 US at 57 n
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B. Other Courts Have Discounted Older Elections Due to
Staleness
In contrast, a number of other courts have discounted older
elections. In Nipper v Chiles,7" the court examined six elections,
four of which were over a decade old. 1 The court declared the
older four elections "stale" and of less probative value than the
more recent elections.7" The court emphasized that most other
vote-dilution cases usually had at least some elections for the
challenged offices occurring "within one or two years of the law-
suit."73 In this case, the most recent election involving a minori-
ty-sponsored candidate occurred approximately six years prior to
the filing of the lawsuit.74 Because of this time lag, the court
held that statistical information garnered from the older elections
was less reliable.75
The Eleventh Circuit has recently engaged in a more sophis-
ticated discussion of these concerns in Nipper v Smith ("Nipper
I/").76 There the court stated:
Although staleness may become a factor when the na-
ture of the electorate or the office at stake has changed
significantly during the intervening period... [t]here
have been no significant structural changes in the sys-
tem used to elect circuit and county court judges in
Florida in the past twenty years, and the electorate...
has not changed in character since the elections in
question took place.77
Thus, while the court endorsed rejecting data that had become
stale, it considered the data in this case accurate after fifteen
years and did not provide a bright-line rule of when such data
would become stale.
The Fifth Circuit has also tempered its earlier liberal accep-
tance of old data. In League of United Latin American Citizens,
Council No. 4434 v Clements ("LULAC 1T"),78 the court reversed
70 795 F Supp 1525 (M D Fla 1992).
71 Id at 1534.
72 Id.
71 Id, citing Gingles, 478 US 30 (examining elections occurring within three years of
filing of the complaint), and Solomon, 899 F2d at 1012.
71 Chiles, 795 F Supp at 1540.
71 Id at 1542.
76 39 F3d 1494 (11th Cir 1994), cert denied 1995 WL 05718 (1995).
71 Id at 1538.
78 999 F2d 831 (5th Cir 1993).
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its holding in LULAC I. Although the court did not explicitly
reject the use of older elections, it strongly suggested that "dated
statistics" should be discounted because they would have limited
utility in a "practical and searching appraisal of contemporary
conditions ... .)79 The dead statistical data supported a conclu-
sion that the evidence was insufficient in light of the "totality of
circumstances" to support a finding of racial polarization.0 The
court did not discuss Nipper I's argument that discounting would
penalize minority voters with the same institutional barriers that
traditionally inhibited minority participation.
C. Electoral Data More than Ten Years Old Should be Weighted
to Reflect Demographic and Political Realities
Evidence of racial polarization is a critical element of a Sec-
tion 2 claim; l therefore, it is purely fortuitous that most courts
have not yet faced the question of whether an election is too stale
to aid in racial polarization analysis. In regions where minorities
are most likely to allege inadequate political participation, minor-
ities are also less likely to be candidates."
A practical solution to the staleness debate is difficult. A
bright-line rule would prevent disparity in application yet would
be ill suited to the fact specific scenarios of vote-dilution cases."
Moreover, any absolute time limit would be arbitrary; why
should the time limit be ten years rather than fifteen years?
The practical answer to these concerns is a weighted system
in which no election would be disregarded. Instead, older elec-
tions would be progressively discounted until their analytical
worth was minimal. Gingles itself implies that all elections
" Id at 891. "The plaintiff's case was further weakened by their use of dated statis-
tics: three of the five indigenous elections they submitted were held in 1972, 1974, and
1978. There is no evidence of a practical and searching appraisal of contemporary condi-
tions in Jefferson County. We have here no more than marginal proof of illegal vote
dilution." Id (Internal citation omitted).
'0 Id.
SI See Gingles, 478 US at 48-49 n 15.
See Nipper I, 1 F3d at 1179, quoting Westwego, 872 F2d at 1209 n 9.
See Gingles, 478 US at 57-58. "As must be apparent, the degree of racial bloc
voting that is cognizable as an element of a § 2 vote dilution claim will vary according to a
variety of factual circumstances." Id. "As both amended § 2 and its legislative history
make clear, in evaluating a statutory claim of vote dilution through districting, the trial
court is to consider the 'totality of the circumstances' and to determine, based 'upon a
searching practical evaluation of the "past and present reality'... whether the political
process is equally open to minority voters. "This determination is peculiarly dependent
upon the facts of each case'... and requires 'an intensely local appraisal of the design
and impact' of the contested electoral mechanisms." Id at 79 (citations omitted).
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should be examined, finding that the best evidence of racial po-
larization is "a pattern of racial bloc voting that extends over a
period of time." 4 Yet the Gingles Court stressed that the polar-
ization analysis required a "'searching practical evaluation of the
"past and present reality"' .... )I" This recognition of the poten-
tial disparity between past and present electoral realities implic-
itly acknowledges the potential harm of punishing an innocent
electorate for abandoned discriminatory practices. Ignoring the
issue of staleness would unfairly value elections that no longer
accurately reflect voting trends.
The VRA's language and legislative history provides the
primary support for discounting elections. The VRA includes a
bailout provision to reward jurisdictions demonstrating electoral
desegregation.8 That provision facilitated removal of a jurisdic-
tion from Section 5's preclearance requirements.87 Initially the
VRA required a good behavior period of five years,88 but Con-
gress lengthened it to ten years in the 1982 amendments.89 This
bailout provision focuses on "whether continuing coverage is
warranted [in light of present performance instead of relying
upon] ... the jurisdiction's conduct 17 years ago."9° Thus, the
VRA's legislative history demonstrates Congress's belief that a
jurisdiction could uncouple itself from its discriminatory past by
demonstrating nondiscriminatory electoral and political practices
over a ten-year period. The bailout provision itself does not end
the staleness debate, however, because the provision only applies
to Section 5's preclearance requirements and not to Section 2
claims.9 Yet the bailout provision should be read to demon-
Id at 57.
Gingles, 478 US at 79 (emphasis added), quoting Senate Judiciary Committee
Report on the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d
Sess 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 USCCAN 177, 208 (cited in note 25).
' 42 USC § 1973b. See also S Rep No 97-417 at 45 (cited in note 25); House Judicia-
ry Committee Report on the Voting Rights Act of 1965, HR Rep No 89-439, 89th Cong, 1st
Sess 15 (1965), reprinted in 1965 USCCAN 2437, 2446 (cited in note 14).
" S Rep No 97-417 at 43 (cited in note 25). To comply with the bailout provisions, the
jurisdiction must show that for ten years it has not used a discriminatory test or device,
failed to obtain preclearance before implementing covered changes in its laws, or enacted
changes which were discriminatory and therefore objected to under Section 5. Id at 47.
The provision showed Congress's implicit recognition that these jurisdictions were pre-
sumed discriminatory at year zero but could expunge themselves of this taint by demon-
strating nondiscriminatory voter-eligibility schemes through year ten.
HR Rep No 89-439 at 15 (cited in note 14).
9 S Rep No 97-417 at 46 (cited in note 25).
'o Id.
91 42 USC § 1973b(1). See S Rep No 97-417 at 46 (cited in note 25). The bailout
provision applies to "jurisdictions that insist on retaining discriminatory procedures or
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strate Congress's recognition that current performance should be
given more weight in Section 2 litigation.
Judicial treatment of other statistical data in voting-rights
cases further supports a weighing process. The most common use
of statistical information occurs during redistricting challeng-
es.92 Plaintiffs in these suits rely on census data to demonstrate
the demographic composition necessary to create a single mem-
ber district with a majority. In Dickinson v Indiana State Elec-
tion Board,9 3 a 1990 case, the court refused to rely on 1980 cen-
sus data.
[We are] concerned that the 1980 census information,
upon which the plaintiffs' complaint is founded and
upon which any reapportionment would be conducted, is
'stale.' One concern that immediately comes to mind is
whether 1980 census information is accurate enough in
1990 to allow the Court to rely on it in fashioning re-
lief. '
The Seventh Circuit arrived at a different conclusion in
McNeil v Springfield Park District.95 In McNeil, plaintiffs chal-
lenged the use of 1980 census data, at that point just eight years
old, as stale.9" The plaintiffs principally relied on Gaffney v
Cummings," which found that the United States census only
measures population at a single instant in time and that
"[d]istrict populations are constantly changing, often at different
rates in either direction, up or down." 8
Although the McNeil court agreed with the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that the census information was probably stale,9 9 it stated
otherwise inhibit full minority participation.. . ." Id.
'2 See Dickinson v Indiana State Election Bd., 740 F Supp 1376 (S D Ind 1990);
McNeil v Springfield Park District, 851 F2d 937 (7th Cir 1988).
'3 740 F Supp at 1376.
'4 Id at 1391.
95 851 F2d 937 (7th Cir 1988).
96Id at 945.
412 US 735 (1973).
McNeil, 851 F2d at 945, quoting Gaffney, 412 US at 746. The McNeil court de-
scribed the United States Census as "more of an event than a process." Id. The court
further explained that "[slubstantial differentials in population growth rates are striking
and well-known phenomena." Id.
'3 Id at 945. "Here the plaintiffs put their finger on a problem that applies not only to
voting rights litigation but also to the fairness of presidential elections by the electoral
college, districting of the House of Representatives and other political apportionment
situations. With a mobile population, the demographic facts may always be a bit stale."
McNeil, 851 F2d at 945.
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that the census data was presumed accurate until a challenger
provided "clear and convincing" evidence to "override the pre-
sumption.""° The court placed its faith in the "hard" census da-
ta 1' despite recognizing that "populations change constant-
ly."1
02
Courts can apply the same argument to election data. Be-
cause the census is taken every ten years, the statistical data at
worst is only a decade out of date. The question of staleness only
arises when the redistricting challenge occurs just before a new
census period.1"3 Although the McNeil court held that census
data would be presumed accurate throughout the ten-year period,
it acknowledged that demographic data was extremely vola-
tile.'" By implication, the McNeil court believed that the cen-
sus snapshot became increasingly hazy as the decade passed.
However, does the census data become stale because of a
change in demographics or simply because a new census is about
to be undertaken? In reality, these two possibilities are remark-
ably similar. A court is naturally reluctant to base a holding on
statistical data that may be proven obsolete by an upcoming
census. 10 5 At the same time, the census's periodic nature re-
veals an underlying sociological and political understanding that
the census "measures population at only a single instant in
time""° and that reliance upon older census data transforms
the basis for judicial holdings from "hard" data1°7 to "a matter
of speculation."' 8 This second argument implies that demo-
oo See id at 946, citing Latino Political Action Comm. v City of Boston, 568 F Supp
1012, 1018 (D C Mass 1985)(finding that Federal census is presumed accurate unless
proven otherwise), and Dixon v Hassler, 412 F Supp 1036, 1040 (W D Tenn
1976)(upholding presumptive correctness of the Federal census).
'0' McNeil, 851 F2d at 946.
i02 Id, citing Gaffney, 412 US at 746.
103 See notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
'o' See note 102 and accompanying text. See also Gaffney, 412 US at 746 n 11, citing
The U.S. Bureau of the Census, Congressional District Data Book, 93d Cong, Connecticut
7 (1972). "In Connecticut, for example, the population of the State as a whole grew by
19.6% during the 1960's. But the population in the area comprising the Second Congres-
sional District grew by over 28%, while the population in the Fourth District grew by only
11.2%." Id.
" See Dickinson, 740 F Supp at 1391. "[T]he Court is concerned that the 1980 census
information, upon which the plaintiffs' complaint is founded and upon which any reappor-
tionment would be conducted, is 'stale'.... Therefore, it is proper to question whether it
is fair or reasonable to require such immense expenditures of time and money to create,
for one election, districts whose lines will probably be changed in another year." Id.
Go Oaffney, 412 US at 746.
See McNeil, 851 F2d at 946.
0' See Dickinson, 740 F Supp at 1391.
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graphic information more than a decade old should be considered
less legally significant."° Similarly, election results over a de-
cade old should be discounted in favor of more recent results. 10
Despite differing opinions on the probative value of census
data,' such data clearly facilitate the staleness analysis. Redis-
tricting claims rely upon proof of voting trends."' Plaintiffs
must show a politically cohesive group that would represent a
majority in a single-member district."' Courts' acknowledgment
of different population growth rates and rapid demographic shifts
applies to general voting trends.14 If a district's ethnic makeup
can change rapidly through divergent population growth, then,
assuming the racial groups vote in a politically cohesive manner,
the voting patterns can also change rapidly. Neither logic nor
practice supports discounting statistics for only one of these re-
lated demographic trends.
Using exogenous elections ameliorates the concern that this
approach will lead many VRA suits to fail due to excessive dis-
counting of electoral data when minority "'candidates "don't run
because they can't win.""' " Although courts have generally ac-
cepted that exogenous elections carry some weight in polarization
analysis,"' courts have been reluctant to accord such elections
dispositive weight in the absence of other relevant data."7 Gen-
'o The census discussion is a useful means for interpreting judicial acknowledgment
of demographic change; however, care should be taken to avoid overzealous application.
The example does not demand rejection of electoral data more than ten years old. The
census presumes that notable demographic change is most practically observed at ten-
year intervals. Courts should use that ten-year benchmark as the best date with which to
begin their analysis of whether the electoral data continues to reflect an electorate's
present reality. Outright rejection of electoral data more than ten years old, however,
would violate Gingles explicit instruction to undertake a "searching practical evaluation of
the past and present reality.... ." Gingles, 478 US at 79, quoting S Rep No 97-417 at 30
(cited in note 25).
"o See LULAC 11, 999 F2d at 831; Williams v State Bd. of Elections, 718 F Supp 1324
(N D Ill 1989)(finding that electoral data did not establish vote dilution); Chiles, 795 F
Supp at 1525; Nipper 1, 1 F3d at 1171; Nipper H, 39 F3d at 1494.
. Compare Dickinson, 740 F Supp at 1376, with McNeil, 851 F2d at 937.
1 See Gingles, 478 US at 57, 79.
Id at 50.
114 See Gaffney, 412 US at 746; Dickinson, 740 F Supp at 1391; McNeil, 851 F2d at
945.
11 Nipper 1, 1 F3d at 1179, quoting Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't, 872 F2d at
1209 n 9.
"' See Jenkins v Red Clay Consolidated School District Bd. of Education, 4 F3d 1103,
1134-35 (3rd Cir 1993)(holding exogenous elections could be considered in racial-bloc vot-
ing analysis); Citizens for a Better Gretna, 834 F2d at 502.
.. See Citizens for a Better Gretna, 834 F2d at 502. "Although exogenous elections
alone could not prove racially polarized voting in Gretna aldermanic elections, the district
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erally, courts have most readily accepted exogenous elections
when they "reflect local voting patterns."' Thus, courts should
use exogenous elections when there is sparse electoral data for
evaluating the offices at issue." Nevertheless, courts should
accord less weight because "exogenous elections [can]not perfectly
mirror the population, issues, or election procedures found" in the
jurisdiction.20 Thus, recognition of the exogenous election
data's validity and utility can help temper any negative effects of
temporal discounting.
Although older election data should be discounted to avoid
penalizing a potentially innocent present-day electorate for a
prior electorate's racial polarization, a bright-line rule establish-
ing an appropriate discount factor would contradict Gingles's
"totality of circumstances" approach. No single discount value
could adequately reflect different electoral periods. For example,
100 percent discounting of old elections might be satisfactory for
annual elections of city officials; however, its use with more infre-
quent elections could be impractical if it routinely eliminated all
but one election from the analysis. Also, use of exogenous data
requires litigants to analyze the extent to which exogenous elec-
toral factors reflect the electorate at issue. Because older election
data must be depreciated to reflect an electorate's changing de-
mographic and political character, the inherently fact-specific
depreciation factor should be calculated in light of each case's
"totality of circumstances."
court properly considered them as additional evidence of bloc voting-particularly in light
of the sparsity of available data." Id.
"' See id at 503. See also Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1134; Westwego, 872 F2d at 1209. "Rather
than implying that plaintiffs may never make out a vote dilution claim when there is no
evidence from 'indigenous' elections, the Gretna case properly focuses the inquiry on the
probative value of the proferred evidence as an indicator of the voting behavior of the
relevant polity .... [Tihe district court should decide whether this evidence qualifies as a
sufficiently local appraisal' to establish some degree of racial bloc voting.., and should
base its ultimate conclusion upon the strength of that evidence, considered in the context
of the 'totality of the circumstances' test." Id.
"' Citizens for a Better Gretna, 834 F2d at 502-03.
20 Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1134 (citation omitted).
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III. COURTS SHOULD REJECT REINTRODUCTION OF A SPECIAL-
CIRCUMSTANCES, DISCRIMINATORY-INTENT TEST
The Gingles Court introduced a "wildcard" into the Section 2
analysis.
[T]he success of a minority candidate in a particular
election does not necessarily prove that the district did
not experience polarized voting in that election; special
circumstances, such as the absence of an opponent,
incumbency, or the utilization of bullet voting, may ex-
plain minority electoral success in a polarized con-
test. 2'
The Court introduced this "wildcard" on the premise that racial-
bloc voting can exist despite occasional victories by minority
candidates. Traditionally this rhetoric has been applied when
minority candidates have had electoral success. 123 However, the
Eleventh Circuit has recently addressed the issue of whether
majority-candidate incumbency should lead to discounting the
existence of racial polarization when a minority candidate los-
es. 124 Using special circumstances in this manner undermines
the Gingles results test and should be rejected.
A. Some Courts Have Applied Special Circumstances Analysis
to Minority Candidate Victory and Defeat
The district court in Nipper v Chiles2 abandoned the tra-
ditional Gingles reading and held that special circumstances,
namely a white candidate's incumbency, could be introduced to
explain minority failure. 28 The incumbency issue arose from
,21 Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 57 (1986).
12 Id.
"z Id. See also Collins v City of Norfolk, Virginia, 883 F2d 1232, 1241 (4th Cir
1989)(cautioning against finding a lack of racially polarized voting where the success of a
minority candidate can be attributed to special circumstances), citing Zimmer v
McKeithen, 485 F2d 1297, 1307 (5th Cir 1973). "[W]e cannot endorse the view that the
success of black candidates at the polls necessarily forecloses the possibility of dilution of
the [African-American] vote .... [Sluch success might be attributable to political support
motivated by different considerations-namely that election of [an African-American]
candidate will thwart successful challenges to electoral schemes on dilution grounds."
Zimmer, 485 F2d at 1307.
124 See Nipper v Chiles, 795 F Supp 1525 (M D Fla 1992)("Chiles")(holding white
incumbency could be used to discount presence of racial polarization).
125 Id.
126 Id at 1542.
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two elections. 127 The first involved an African-American candi-
date who challenged an incumbent white judge who had been in
office for two years; 8 the second involved an African-American
candidate who ran against a white incumbent who was a long-
time resident of the community." The court explained:
In Gingles, the Supreme Court stated that minority
electoral success does not foreclose a vote dilution claim
if that success can be explained by special circumstanc-
es, such as the minority candidate running unopposed,
or the fact that the minority candidate ran as an incum-
bent .... The converse of this proposition must also be
true. That is, any balanced consideration of a vote dilu-
tion claim should also take into account any special
circumstances that may explain minority electoral fail-
ure in a polarized contest.3 °
Thus, the court held that the special circumstances factors identi-
fied by the Gingles Court should be considered both where minor-
ity candidates have been successful and where those candidates
have been defeated.'3 ' The court argued that some elections
were better understood as the result of strong incumbents rather
than racial polarization.3 2 The district court cited no precedent
for its reading of Gingles.
In Nipper II, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting
en banc, held that Nipper I had correctly decided that a success-
ful Section 2 complaint "require[d] more than a mere showing of
electoral losses at the polls by minority candidates."' Indeed,
the court found that Section 2 forbids the use of electoral struc-
tures that "'result[ ] in a denial or abridgment of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or col-
or."" Consequently, VRA plaintiffs could not succeed in litiga-
tion unless the elections had resulted in the defeat of minority
candidates. 3 ' The court distinguished this "racial bias"'36
127 Id.
" See Chiles, 795 F Supp at 1542.
'29 Id at 1542 n 18-19.
0 Id at 1542 (emphasis added).
131 Id.
' Chiles, 795 F Supp at 1542.
Nipper v Smith, 39 F3d 1494, 1515 (11th Cir 1994)("Nipper IT'), cert denied 1995
WL 05718.
'u Id, quoting 42 USC § 1973(a) (1994)(emphasis added).
135 Nipper 11, 39 F3d at 1515.
1 Id at 1521.
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analysis of the electorate's voting motivation from the congressio-
nally rejected Bolden test on the ground that Bolden incorrectly
analyzed "the intent of those responsible for erecting or main-
taining the challenged scheme.""3 7 The Nipper H court contin-
ued:
Not only does the context of ... the Senate Report
clearly indicate what Congress meant by forbidden in-
quiry into discriminatory intent, but the Committee's
language in other sections... demonstrates a congres-
sional desire to retain a basic inquiry into racial bias in
the voting community-an inquiry that is qualitatively
different from the question whether a challenged elec-
tion law or procedure was designed or maintained for a
discriminatory purpose. 3 '
The Nipper H court held that incumbency is often a deter-
mining factor in judicial elections; hence, it is an important factor
that necessarily should be considered in judicial vote-dilution
litigation.139
The presence or absence of incumbents in particular
races may go a long way toward explaining the pattern
of election results presented, thereby aiding in the reso-
lution of the fundamental question of whether the vot-
ing community is driven by racial bias that is operating
through the challenged at-large election system to di-
lute the voting strength 'of minority voters."4
The court tempered this statement by adding that the analysis
should also acknowledge that the white officials were not "estab-
lished" or "strong" incumbents."'
B. Rejecting Dual Application of the Special-Circumstances
Analysis
The Eleventh Circuit read Gingles differently in Nipper I.
The court began its discussion by highlighting the weak nature of
the incumbents.' One of the white incumbent judges was not
17 Id at 1522 (footnote omitted).
138 Id.
1" Nipper II, 39 F3d at 1535.
140 Id at 1539.
141 Id.
14 Nipper v Smith, 1 F3d 1171, 1181 (11th Cir 1993)("Nipper P).
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even an attorney but had been grandfathered from a period when
nonattorneys were permitted to run for county judgeships.'
Furthermore, the white incumbent had been given the worst
ratings in the bar polls of any judge in the circuit, including an
"unqualified" rating by 82% of the lawyers polled; the town's only
daily newspaper and a public teacher's organization had both en-
dorsed the minority candidate.'" In the other election, the
white incumbent had been appointed to a vacancy and had been
an incumbent judge for only 100 days before running in the con-
tested election.'" Contrary to the district court, the Nipper I
court found that "these elections are hardly 'evidence of the pow-
er of incumbency."""
Nipper ls rejection of the district court's reasoning ran deep-
er than just a review of these particular incumbents' performanc-
es.
We interpret Gingles to permit consideration of special
circumstances only to explain variations from a usual
pattern of racially polarized voting. In other words,
special circumstances may explain minority electoral
success in a polarized election; however, contrary to the
district court's interpretation, the converse is not also
true. 147
The court reasoned that special circumstances could only be used
to explain minority success; the Gingles Court only contemplated
situations where a minority candidate would succeed despite
white-bloc voting. 1" Gingles did not discuss the possibility of
applying the special circumstances analysis to elections where
minority-sponsored candidates were defeated.149 The Nipper I
court stressed that a contrary reading "'turns the [Gingles]
Court's language on its head ....
143 Id.
1" Id.
14 Id.
'* Nipper I, 1 F3d at 1181, quoting Chiles, 795 F Supp at 1542.
'4' Nipper I, 1 F3d at 1181.
148 Id.
Id, discussing Gingles, 478 US at 57.
Nipper I, 1 F3d at 1181, quoting Williams v State Bd. of Elections, 718 F Supp
1324, 1329 (N D Ill 1989). See also Williams, 718 F Supp at 1329. "We fail to see how the
passage from Gingles can intelligibly be read in that way. The Court was referring to
circumstances that would allow a minority-preferred candidate to win, notwithstanding a
degree of white bloc voting that would normally defeat such a candidate. An example of
such a circumstance would be a minority-preferred candidate running unopposed. The
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C. Courts Should Reject Dual Application of the Special-
Circumstances Analysis
Under Congress's explicit rejection of Bolden's intent
test,'5 1 courts cannot reintroduce an intent requirement. Nipper
II, however, does just that, subtly reintroducing an intent re-
quirement in the guise of the special circumstances "wildcard."
That is, a racial bias test requires a Section 2 plaintiff to demon-
strate that the electorate voted for a white incumbent for racial
reasons rather than for work performance. In Nipper II, Judge
Joseph Hatchett dissented because he felt the court "[had em-
ployed) a strained review of the legislative history and Supreme
Court interpretation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act." 5'
Judge Hatchett continued in dissent: "Yet, despite this searching
effort [by the majority], absolutely no authority exists in either
the case law, the legislative history, or the language of the Act
to... impose a racial bias inquiry into Voting Rights Act litiga-
tion."
53
An analysis of legislative history and case law demonstrates
that the electorate's racial motivation had never been a required
basis for a VRA challenge."M Instead, because the Supreme
Court has upheld the validity of the VRA under the enforcement
provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 5 the
federal courts have applied the same standards to vote-dilution
claims under the Fifteenth Amendment and Section 2.6' Thus,
white bloc, regardless of its strength, would have no one else for whom to vote." Id.
Nipper I did not comment on whether special circumstances could ever make the proba-
tive value of an election too minimal. One other court has interpreted the Gingles lan-
guage in a manner consistent with Nipper I. See Williams, 718 F Supp at 1329-30.
"' See Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1982, S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 USCCAN 177,
205 (cited in note 25).
.52 Nipper II, 39 F3d at 1547 (Hatchett dissenting).
Id.
Id at 1548 (Hatchett dissenting).
Id (Hatchett dissenting), citing South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301
(1966)(holding the VRA to be a valid effectuation of the Fifteenth Amendment); Georgia v
United States, 411 US 526 (1973)(discussing Section 5 of the VRA); Briscoe v Bell, 432 US
404 (1977)(holding the VRA to be a valid effectuation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments); Rome v United States, 446 US 156 (1980)(finding that the VRA does not
exceed Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment); Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US
112 (1970Xdiscussing the limits of Congress's power under the VRA).
" Nipper II, 39 F3d at 1549 (Hatchett dissenting), quoting Mobile v Bolden, 446 US
55 (1980)("the language of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, and... it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth
Amendment itself"); Frank R. Parker, The Results Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act: Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 Va L Rev 715 (1983)(discussing the 1982 amend-
431
432 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1995:
successful VRA challenges under the Fifteenth Amendment and
the VRA targeted only the intentions or consequences of state-
enacted voting-rights regimes.
"The racial bias inquiry was only relevant to demonstrate the
intent of the legislature in utilizing a particular electoral system
that disadvantaged racial minorities."157 The pre-Bolden results
test, explicitly reinstituted by the 1982 VRA Amendments, did
not proscribe individual voter racial discrimination. Rather, that
results test prohibited discrimination by state officials that inten-
tionally or effectively disadvantaged minorities.5 8
[The electorate racial bias test is] merely a resurrection
in different garb of a claim expressly rejected by the
Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles .... ["The]
suggestion that the discriminatory intent of individual
white voters must be proved in order to make out a § 2
claim must fail for the very reasons Congress rejected
the intent test with respect to government bodies.["] 5
A return to an intent test would have a "decidedly negative
impact on the ability of minority voters to end discrimina-
tion"16° because of the test's "unacceptably difficult burden."'
It is difficult to conceive how the hardships imposed by an analy-
sis of an electorate's purpose could be more acceptable than the
burden imposed by the rejected Bolden examination of legislative
intent.
The VRA's text and legislative history reject reintroduction of
racial-bias analysis. Section 2 unambiguously provides that elec-
toral structures and procedures cannot be used in a manner that
"results" in the denial of the right to vote on account of race.6 2
As the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 Amendments stat-
ed:
[I]t is patently [clear] that Congress has used the words
"on account of race or color" in the Act to mean "with
respect to" race or color, and not to connote any re-
ments to the VRA).
157 Nipper I, 39 F3d at 1548 (Hatchett dissenting).
" Id at 1551 (Hatchett dissenting), citing Gingles, 478 US at 30.
"' Nipper 11, 39 F2d at 1555 (Hatchett dissenting), quoting Gingles, 478 US at 71.
" S Rep No 97-417 at 37 (cited in note 25).
"' Id at 16.
Nipper II, 39 F3d at 1552 (Hatchett dissenting). "In no manner does this language
reference a need to inquire into the racial biases of individual voters." Id.
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quired purpose of racial discrimination. Any other argu-
ments based on similar parsing of isolated words in the
bill that there is some implied "purpose" component in
Section 2, even when plaintiffs proceed under the re-
sults standard, are equally misplaced and incorrect."3
Moreover, "'a voting practice or procedure which is discriminatory
in result, should not be allowed to stand, regardless of whether
there exists a discriminatory purpose' . . . ."" Requiring an
analysis into voter motivation would directly contravene
Congress's express intent and the Gingles Court's adoption of the
results test. Consequently, a racial-bias analysis of special cir-
cumstances must be rejected.
CONCLUSION
Congress's adoption of the results test and Gingles's reliance
on evidence of racial polarization requires courts to evaluate elec-
tion data in Section 2 litigation. Courts should weigh all elections
but discount older, staler elections more than ten years old. This
discounting is necessary because of demographic changes and the
ten-year benchmark suggested by Congress in the VRA bailout
provisions and by the courts in census data evaluations. In light
of the Gingles "totality of circumstances" rejuirement, courts
should calculate the quantum of discounting required by looking
to actual demographic changes. Any fears that such discounting
will penalize minority groups is ameliorated by including exoge-
nous elections. Although a court should accord exogenous election
data less probative value because such data cannot perfectly
mirror the jurisdiction at issue, the data should nevertheless be
used to supplement endogenous election results when it reflects
local voting patterns.
Similarly, Nipper ITs proposed discounting of minority spon-
sored candidates' election failures due to special circumstances
should be rejected. Utilization of special circumstances to explain
minority failure would effectively reintroduce an intent-based
test by enabling Section 2 defendants to argue that white voters
were motivated by nonracial incentives when they voted for
1"3 S Rep No 97-417 at 28-29 n 109 (cited in note 25).
14 Id at 194 (additional views of Senator Robert Dole). "It should be reemphasized
that the 'results' test contained in the substitute amendment in no way includes an
element of discriminatory purpose... Section 2 should only require plaintiffs to establish
discriminatory 'results' and... [no] element of purpose should be incorporated into the
standard." Id.
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white incumbents. Legislative history demonstrates Congress's
desire to eliminate any intent-based test in racial-bloc voting
analysis. Moreover, Gingles rejected introduction of an
electorate's motivation on grounds that it contradicted Congress's
explicit instructions that an electoral practice which is discrimi-
natory in result should not be allowed to stand, regardless of
whether a discriminatory purpose exists.
